Introduction
In November 2009, Australia and India announced a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, intended to set out shared strategic perspectives and create a framework for the further development of bilateral security cooperation. At the same time, Prime Minister Rudd told an audience in New Delhi that India and Australia were 'natural partners' and should become 'strategic partners' (Rudd 2009 ). Rudd's comments reflect a common assumption that the strategic perspectives of Australia and India are inexorably converging and there is no reason why they will not become close economic, political and security partners in the coming years. This article tests that view and considers some potential differences in strategic interest that may arise as India extends its power in the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean is taking an increasingly prominent place in Australia's security calculations. While Australia's traditional security focus has been towards South-East Asia, since 1973 virtually all of Australia's military engagements (including Kuwait, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan) have been in the Indian Ocean region and there is reason to believe that this will continue. As Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper stated: 'Over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning ' (Australian Government 2009: 37) . This article will discuss the potential limits of strategic convergence between Australia and India with particular reference to the Indian Ocean. It will first provide an overview of recent developments in the strategic relationship. It will then review perceptions of strategic convergence between Australia and India. Third, it will examine India's naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean. Fourth, this article will consider how India's maritime ambitions have the potential to diverge from Australia's interests. It will conclude that these potential differences in interest reinforce the imperatives for, and underline some of the difficulties in, Australia's strategic engagement with India.
Recent developments in the AustraliaÁIndia relationship
Australia's security relationship with India has long been uneasy. However, the relationship has certainly come a long way, particularly since 1998 when Australia (along with Japan) led international condemnation of India's Pokhran II nuclear tests. Recent improvements in the relationship have largely been in step with improvements in India's security relationship with the United States, capped by the recent nuclear cooperation agreement under which the United States effectively recognised India as a de facto nuclear power. 1 As part of India's 'Look East' policy, since the early 1990s India has also been seeking to develop economic, political and security relationships throughout East Asia, most particularly with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam. 2 These relationships are driven by a common interest to balance China's rising power in East Asia and a desire on the part of India to extend its influence as a regional power. For India, in many ways the relationship with Australia is an extension both of its 'Look East' policy and of its relationship with the United States.
The security engagement between Australia and India has gained some momentum over the last few years, primarily at Australia's initiative. Australian prime ministers have made several visits to New Delhi in the last decade and there have been numerous ministerial-level engagements. This has led to several bilateral agreements on security-related matters, including a 2003 agreement on terrorism, a 2006 memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation, a 2007 defence information-sharing arrangement, and agreements on intelligence dialogue, extradition and terrorism in 2008. Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper flagged the 'strong mutual interest' of Australia and India in enhancing maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, commenting that: 'As India extends its reach and influence into areas of shared strategic interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and our understanding of Indian strategic thinking ' (Australian Government 2009: 96) .
In November 2009, the Australian and Indian prime ministers announced a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The security declaration is a nonbinding declaration of principles and understandings in security matters, and establishes a bilateral framework for further cooperation in security matters.
Australia also has similar security declarations with Japan (in 2007) and South Korea (in March 2009) . Although the AustraliaÁIndia security declaration itself contains little new of immediate substance, it is a notable step in establishing a framework for the further development of the security relationship, including the formalisation of regular consultations and dialogues between foreign ministers, senior military and diplomatic representatives, and joint working groups on maritime security operations and counterterrorism and immigration. In conjunction with the security declaration, Australia and India finalised new cooperation arrangements in intelligence, law enforcement, border security, terrorist financing and money laundering. Australia has also sought to encourage greater interaction between the defence forces. Australia is keen to participate in the USÁIndian Malabar naval exercises and has also invited India to participate in the Australian-hosted multilateral Kakadu and Pitch Black exercises in northern Australia.
While a degree of bilateral security cooperation is developing, both Australia and India have been cautious about giving the relationship broader strategic significance, particularly in allowing it to be perceived as anything that might resemble a coalition against China. In 2007, Japan proposed a 'quadrilateral' dialogue among it, India, the United States and Australia. Despite official denials, this was widely viewed as part of a policy to balance or contain China, and was viewed by some as the beginnings of a four-way alliance between the United States, Japan, India and Australia. These perceptions were reinforced by the large-scale Malabar naval exercises held later that year in the Bay of Bengal, involving India, the United States, Australia, Japan and Singapore. Over the course of 2007, both Australia and India backed away from participation in the quadrilateral dialogue, largely in the face of concerns about China's reactions.
Despite the recent security declaration, the political relationship also remains somewhat uneasy, and there are several ongoing irritants in the relationship. The most significant in security terms has been the nuclear issue, where Australia, for domestic political reasons, has not yet been able to fully accommodate new India's status as a nuclear power outside of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although Australia supported approval of the USÁIndia nuclear deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in August 2008, its continuing refusal to supply uranium to India is inevitably taken as indicating a lack of commitment to the relationship. Given the level of political opposition in Australia, Australia's position on the supply of uranium to India seems unlikely to change very soon.
Perceptions of strategic convergence between Australia and India
Australian security analysts strongly support a closer security engagement between Australia and India, apparently seeing few conflicts of strategic interest. Many agree with Mr Rudd that Australia and India are 'natural' strategic partners. With the end of the cold war and the strategic rapprochement between India and the United States, it is widely believed that the gates are now open for Australia and India to recognise their shared perspectives and build a close strategic partnership reflecting common interests in such matters as terrorism, maritime security and regional security architecture.
Gurry, in her detailed review of the history of the relationship since the end of World War II, describes the long-standing strategic estrangement between Australia and India as a failure to establish a common purpose and shared perspective (Gurry 1996) . According to Gurry, this is essentially the result of a number of 'unfortunate' historical factors, including differing cold war alignments, inaccurate or out-of-date perceptions on both sides, and a lack of complementarity of commercial goals. Each side has neglected the relationship and has arguably developed a particular 'blind spot' for the other. The end of cold war alignments, closer economic relations and a little political foresight will allow this situation to be remedied. For Gurry, the case for closer relations is unambiguous: 'Any cursory glance at a map of Australia in its region reveals the geographic logic of Australia seeking closer ties with India' (Gurry 1996: vii) .
Gordon also sees the AustraliaÁIndia relationship in benign terms. Gordon suggests that Australia and India are on the same basic 'strategic wavelength', although Australia has to be careful to explain to New Delhi the nuances of its relationships with the United States and China so that India will recognise Australia as an independent player in the region (Gordon 2007: 50) . Similarly, Medcalf (2008b: 1) sees cold war 'circumstances' as having obstructed closer engagement between Australia and India, and that they are 'logical strategic partners'. According to Medcalf, the geostrategic interests of the two countries are 'essentially congruent. Neither sees the other as a potential security problem, and indeed they openly recognise each other as factors for stability in their shared region' (Medcalf and Gill 2009: 3) . Bonnor takes a somewhat more cautious view of the relationship, commenting that Australia and India have limited bilateral security interests in common and that these are not of enormous weight in each country's strategic outlook. However, 'given geographical proximity across a common ocean, at the very least it would be beneficial for Australia and India to better understand each other's security perceptions and preoccupations' (Bonnor 2001: 13Á4) .
Few Indian security analysts give detailed consideration to Australia. Australia is broadly seen as an element in India's 'Look East' policy, although not having the priority afforded to India's relations in South-East Asia and Japan. Some, such as Brahma Chellaney (2007) , see Australia as a potentially useful junior partner along with the United States and Japan in an informal coalition to balance against China. Others, such as C. Raja Mohan (2007) , who oppose the idea of any coalition against China, nevertheless define Indo-Australian common interests in terms of building an Asian order that addresses mutual concerns about China. In general, however, Australia is perceived to have little to offer India beyond resources and it is assumed that Australia will always follow the US lead in security matters. Thus, there is little perceived imperative to engage with Australia or any real sense that India should take Australia's opinions into consideration, particularly when making judgments about China or the Indian Ocean (Copley 2009: 127) .
Australian analysts commonly cite areas in which there is significant scope for bilateral security cooperation, such as in maritime policing (piracy and maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, people trafficking, etc.) and disaster management in the eastern Indian Ocean and anti-terrorism throughout the region. In the political-security arena, Australia and India are likely to have significant shared interests in ensuring that any future Asian regional architecture includes both India and Australia, two outliers from the core of East Asia. Australia and India also have shared interests in the political stability in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and South-East Asia (particularly Indonesia). There may also be scope for cooperation on particular issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (Medcalf and Gill 2009) . Underlying this is a strong incentive in Australia to see India become a major investor in its resources sector to match other major investors such as China. India also has good reason to want to develop Australia as a major energy supplier.
There is much to be said for these views and a perceived imperative for Australia to better engage with one of Asia's giants. For many, it is a surprise that two neighbours, with common democratic values and a shared heritage in political and legal institutions, have never found good reason to cooperate closely in political, economic and security issues. It is therefore natural to identify 'exogenous' factors (such as differing cold war alignments) that have historically kept Australia and India apart. However, this analysis often also fails to consider the existence of underlying differences of interest that might have contributed to the long estrangement between Australia and India. This article will argue that underlying differences of interest do exist: as India emerges as one of the major powers of Asia and moves beyond its historical preoccupations in South Asia, it will almost inevitably take on many of the trappings of a great power, some of which may become of concern to Australia.
India's strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean
While a continentalist perspective has traditionally dominated Indian strategic thinking, maritime security has an increasing role in India's calculations. Driven by ideas of its own 'manifest destiny' and a developing strategic rivalry with China, India has over the last two decades been expanding its naval power in the Indian Ocean.
India occupies a highly strategic position in the northern Indian Ocean, potentially allowing it to control the key sea lines of communication to and from the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait. India's central position in the northern Indian Ocean and its presumed future as a great power contribute to a commonly held view about India's destiny to attain a dominant role in its eponymous ocean. K.M. Panikkar, the 'father' of Indian maritime strategy, argued that the Indian Ocean must remain 'truly Indian', and advocated the creation of a 'steel ring' around India through the establishment of forward naval bases in Singapore, Mauritius, Yemen and Sri Lanka (Panikkar 1962: 15) . There is a well-established tradition among the Indian strategic community that the Indian Ocean is, or should be, 'India's Ocean' (Berlin 2006: 60; Scott 2006: 99) . According to Admiral Prakash (2006: 556) , Indian Chief of Naval Staff: 'India holds the centre stage in the only ocean in the world named after a country'.
India is in the process of significantly enhancing its naval power projection capabilities. The navy's share of the defence budget has risen significantly. According to Prakash (2006) , India aims to exercise selective sea control of the Indian Ocean through task forces built around aircraft carriers. India, which currently has a single aging aircraft carrier, has plans for three carrier task forces that will form the core of three separate fleets in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Buszynski (2009: 84) believes that India's naval expansion program, if fully implemented, would place it in a dominant position in the Indian Ocean, although the program will depend on adequate funding in the years to come. This last point is important. India has a long tradition of its strategic ambitions surpassing its capabilities, of strategic goals and military expansion plans going unfulfilled, reflecting its impatience to be recognised as a great power combined with a long-standing lack of coordination in strategic planning.
India's naval ambitions extend to developing an Indian sphere of influence across the northern Indian Ocean. This should be no surprise. Realists argue that it is natural for especially powerful states to seek regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001: 232) . One study of India's regional plans concluded that: a rising India will try to establish regional hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region . . . just like all the other rising powers have since Napoleonic times, with the long term goal of achieving great power status on an Asian and perhaps even global scale (Pardesi 2005: 55) .
Many believe that, since independence, India has sought to impose its own 'Monroe Doctrine' on South Asia, and some suggest that there are now ambitions to extend this across the north-east Indian Ocean (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008b) . The Indian navy has come to see itself as destined to become the predominant maritime security provider in a region stretching from the Red Sea to Singapore, and having a significant security role in areas beyond, including the South China Sea (Scott 2006) . This is an area which the former Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, called India's 'sphere of influence' (Times of India 2001) and the current Prime Minister has more diplomatically called India's 'strategic footprint' (Singh 2004) . While India's strategic ambitions are primarily focused on the northern Indian Ocean, India has also made significant progress in developing maritime security partnerships with island states in the mid and southern Indian Ocean, including the Maldives, Mauritius and Madagascar (Brewster 2010b ).
India's ambitions for predominance in the Indian Ocean region underpin its security ambitions in South-East Asia. Over the last two decades, the Indian navy has played an active role in extending India's influence throughout the Indian Ocean region and maritime South-East Asia (Scott 2007) . India has placed significant emphasis on achieving a predominant position in the Bay of Bengal and the western approaches to the Malacca Strait, including through the development of military facilities in the Andaman Islands as the base for a new tri-service Far Eastern Strategic Command. It has been suggested that, for India, the Malacca Strait represents a rough counterpart to the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States in terms of its ability to maintain regional hegemony (Holmes et al. 2009: 154) . The Malacca Strait lies on the major sea line of communication and represents the main choke point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indian's ability to control the Strait is seen as a prerequisite of effective control of the eastern Indian Ocean. India is now seeking a direct security role inside the Strait, an important factor underlying India's strategic relationships with both Singapore and Indonesia.
India's maritime strategy is not without its critics. Varun Sahni, for example, has criticised 'an inflated vision of naval threats and capabilities' in India, leading to overambitiousness in pursuing a strategy of sea control around aircraft carriers over a strategy of sea denial centred on submarines. India has not faced a threat to its shores, even remotely, since 1971, nor is one likely to arise in the foreseeable future. Sahni warns: 'The mothballed [Soviet] vessels from Archangel to Sevastapol to Vladivostok are a grim warning of what happens to a continental state that harbours overly grandiose maritime ambitions' (Roberts and Sahni 2005: 25) .
Strategic competition with China has been an important factor for India's attempts to consolidate and expand its maritime security role in the Indian Ocean. While some see the 'China factor' as a convenient justification for India's naval procurement program, it also carries with it the potential to fuel confrontation between India and China in the Indian Ocean and even the South China Sea. Since the early 1990s, many Indian military leaders and analysts have repeatedly raised concerns about a perceived Chinese plan of maritime 'encirclement' of India through China's so-called 'String of Pearls' strategy. 4 This has included claims of Chinese involvement in the construction of deepwater ports in Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; the establishment of a Chinese military listening or communications facilities in Pakistan and Burma; and an attempt by China to construct a submarine base in the Maldives. 5 China's relationships in the Indian Ocean region are widely perceived among Indian analysts as being directed against India rather than being a legitimate reflection of Chinese interests in its sea lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean. New Delhi's instincts are to deal with the perceived threat by seeking to exclude China from the Indian Ocean, whether through seeking to form exclusive security relationships with Indian Ocean island states or excluding China from regional forums, such as the Indian-sponsored Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. However, this approach only serves to increase China's security dilemma. A recent offer by India to provide maritime security to Chinese ships in the north-west Indian Ocean (People's Daily 2010) involves an important acknowledgement by New Delhi that China does have legitimate security concerns in the Indian Ocean, and could well lead to some tactical cooperation between them (for example, against Somali pirates). However, given the broader context of Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, it seems improbable that China would be prepared to outsource its maritime security needs to India*/ certainly without China being invited to play a greater institutional role in Indian Ocean security.
Over the last decade or so, the United States has played a significant role in India's strategic ambitions. In March 2005, the Bush administration announced that it would help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century, seeking to build India's capabilities as an implicit balance to China. As a senior US official in New Delhi put it: 'India as a global power is in an early, formative phase. The United States' job for the next 5 to 10 years is to promote, assist and shape that process' (Twining 2007: 82) . Since the 1990s, much of the US focus in the relationship has been on encouraging India's naval ambitions and expansion of its naval capabilities, including, according to some, calling for India to coordinate its maritime strategy with the United States in the Persian Gulf, South-East Asia and as far as the Taiwan Strait (Tellis 2002: 262Á3) . In 2001, Secretary of State designate, Colin Powell, told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that: 'India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this endeavor ' (Washington File 2001) . Similarly, US Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, commented in 2008 that the United States welcomed India 'taking up the responsibility to ensure security in this part of the world' (Dikshit 2008 ) (by 'this part of the world', the United States does not necessarily mean the Persian Gulf, where the United States has remained reluctant to involve India in Gulf security).
The United States has given particular encouragement to India to increase its naval presence in the north-east Indian Ocean (including building the Andaman Island naval base) and has indicated that it would be happy to see India take a direct security role inside the Malacca Strait. In 2006, the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Roughead, commented that the United States was 'not interested' in patrolling the region, while, according to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, the United States was 'very comfortable with the fact that India has offered its assistance' in providing security in the Strait (India Defence 2006). Much (but not all) of this is a reflection of a desire by the United States to build India as an important balancing factor against China, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. The United States has an incentive to play India and China off against each other and in recent years may have encouraged Indian fears of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean. 6 Japan, too, may be willing to recognise a leading naval role for India in the Indian Ocean. Many in Japan see the evolving security relationship with India primarily in terms of a maritime coalition. For Japan, the most immediate benefit of a security relationship with India is its ability to provide maritime security to Japan in the Indian Ocean in combination with or, potentially, as an alternative to the United States. As the former Chairman of Joint Staff of the Japanese Defense Agency, Admiral Natsukawa, commented in 2006: 'Only India has the capability and intention for security cooperation in this huge sea area [the Indian Ocean], the west side of the Malacca Strait' (Natsukawa 2006) .
Australian perspectives on India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean region
Australia is likely to be less willing to recognise any Indian claims of a 'predominant' maritime role in the Indian Ocean, much less any Indian sphere of influence in the north-east Indian Ocean. Australian concerns about India's naval ambitions are not new. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, many in the Australian security community showed considerable (if unspecified) apprehensions about India's naval modernisation and expansion program. Thus, in a speech in Beijing in March 1990, Australian Air Marshall David Evans chided India for its spending on defence, commenting that: 'Perhaps it is no more than excessive nationalism that compels India to seek an almost dominant role in the Indian Ocean' (Bhutani 1995: 376) . These concerns were motivated not only by India's security relationship with the Soviet Union but also by unease about India's own intentions in the region which, it was perceived, India had made little effort to explain. India was highly sensitive to Australian comments, which were seen as potentially obstructing India's efforts to improve relations in South-East Asia. The Australian government sought to defuse the controversy, with Minister of Defence Kim Beazley (1988) stating that India 'has never and does not threaten Australia'. Although India was largely successful in dispelling regional concerns about its naval expansion program during the 1990s, an element of friction between Australia and India over maritime security continued for some time.
An expansion of India's naval capabilities, particularly in maritime policing functions, is now widely seen in Australia as enhancing Indian Ocean security. However, this view could change according to the extent that India seeks to become the predominant naval power in parts of the Indian Ocean or if India's ambitions lead to heightened naval rivalry with China.
India as a residual legatee of US naval power in the north-east Indian Ocean
One possible way of understanding India's naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean, and the role of the United States in facilitating those ambitions, is in seeing India as a potential residual legatee of US naval predominance in the Indian Ocean. According to this view, the United States may be willing to cede to India a role as the leading maritime security provider in the north-east Indian Ocean in the context of the relative decline in US military power throughout the world and as more pressing security concerns arise elsewhere. Some have compared this to the late nineteenth/early twentieth century handover by Britain to the United States of primary responsibility for maritime security in the western hemisphere and its ceding of a leading maritime security role to Japan in the Pacific, as Britain focused its energies on balancing against the maritime threat posed by Germany in the North Atlantic (Holmes et al. 2009 ).
What might be the consequences of this for Australia? Some might see significant benefits to Australia in arrangements between the United States and friendly regional powers over maritime security. However, Australia's last experience in seeing its strategic guarantor delegate regional security to another power was not a happy one. As already noted, in the early years of the twentieth century, Britain sought to leverage its maritime power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans through entering into a naval alliance with Japan, allowing Britain to largely withdraw its naval forces from the region. As a result, during World War I, the Japanese navy took a leading role in protecting Australian troop convoys against German maritime threats in the Indian Ocean and in expelling Germany from its Pacific possessions.
Throughout the Anglo-Japanese alliance between 1902 and 1922, Australian perspectives wavered between support and opposition. The Australians saw considerable tactical benefits in the arrangement in protecting sea lanes of communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and, it has been suggested, longer-term strategic benefits in channelling Japanese expansionism away from Australia and towards China. However, these perceived benefits were balanced by concerns about implications of the alliance on Asian immigration, fears about Japan's seizure of Germany's Pacific possessions and, most importantly, concerns about the impact of the alliance on Britain's long-term security commitment to the region (Hirama 2004; Lowe 1997) . The alliance had a longlasting effect on the balance of naval power in the Pacific, facilitating Japan's rise as the predominant naval power in the western Pacific, supported by a string of naval bases acquired from Germany. The alliance helped propel a revisionist Japan into great-power status, emboldening its ambitions in East Asia and the Pacific.
Few, if any, would suggest that an emerging and democratic India has similar expansionist and imperialist tendencies as those displayed by a rising and authoritarian Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. As Beazley commented in 1988, there is no real threat perception about India in Australia, and it is hard now to think of circumstances where India might constitute a realistic threat to Australia. There is also no suggestion that the United States might contemplate a wholesale abandonment of the Indian Ocean in the same way that Britain abandoned the Pacific. The strategic imperatives for the United States in the Middle East would seem to guarantee a significant US naval presence in the north-west Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future.
However, the issue for Australia is not simply one of capabilities or the potential for a reduced US regional presence, but also about the management of expectations. Australia would, for example, have significant concerns if India's ambitions for naval predominance involved a failure by it to accept the legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean of littoral states and extra-regional powers. India has generally shown sensitivity to the interests of other littoral states, but less sensitivity towards the interests of extra-regional powers, particularly China. As discussed below, of particular concern in the current security environment would be if India's ambitions further fed China's existing security dilemma, leading to heightened rivalry between India and China in the Indian Ocean.
Australia's experience with Japan in the first half of the twentieth century is an obvious lesson about the dangers that may arise when Australia's security guarantor makes security arrangements with rising regional powers without the close involvement of Australia. Of course, Australia is much better placed in the early twenty-first century than it was in the early twentieth century to play an active role in the development of its security environment. Australia can avoid simply 'slotting in' as a junior US alliance partner underneath the umbrella of the Indo-US strategic relationship, where there is a considerable risk that its interests will be overlooked. These potential concerns should give further impetus to Australia's efforts to both insert itself into the USÁIndia strategic relationship and develop a partnership with India independent of that relationship.
Australian perspectives on IndiaÁChina naval rivalry
As noted, a key area of concern for Australia in the Indian Ocean is the potential for naval rivalry between India and China. Some in Australia see the 'China threat' as a key factor in the AustraliaÁIndia security relationship. According to this view, Australia, along with the United States and Japan, should join with India to form a coalition to balance or contain an authoritarian However, far from being united by a 'China threat', there are, and likely will continue to be, significant differences in Australian and Indian perceptions of China's role in regional security. Although Canberra has remained publicly silent on claims about the 'String of Pearls', Australian commentators have tended to treat Indian claims with a considerable degree of scepticism, disputing the nature of Chinese involvement in the Indian Ocean region and China's motivations. Some regard Indian claims about China's 'String of Pearls' in the north-east Indian Ocean as exaggerated (Buszynski 2009: 86; Gordon 2007: 4) . Selth's (2007) detailed analysis of Indian claims about Chinese military facilities in Burma concluded that it is unlikely that any Chinese military personnel are permanently based in Burma or directly operate any intelligence-collection stations there. Australian analysts also tend to see any Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean less in terms of an encirclement of India and more as an expression of China's legitimate interests in protecting its key trading routes to the Middle East and Europe (see, for example, Copley 2009: 101) . It is arguable that any logistical facilities in the Indian Ocean (including, in particular, Gwadar port in Pakistan) would not likely be of strategic value to China in wartime conditions (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008a) . There are also significant doubts about China's ability to project significant power into the Indian Ocean. Buszynski (2009: 77) suggests that the protection of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean by China would require a 'massive commitment' of resources over the next 15Á20 years, which is not yet evident.
From Australia's perspective, the prospect of heightened naval rivalry in the eastern Indian Ocean or the South China Sea would be viewed seriously. It would be difficult not to conclude that many in New Delhi currently have a 'zero-sum' outlook on India's strategic competition with China in the Indian Ocean region. The development of Indian naval capabilities in the northern Indian Ocean, and particularly in and around the Malacca Strait, will only serve to worsen China's security dilemma. Further, any significant projection of Indian naval power into the South China Sea (for example, from port facilities in Singapore or Vietnam) would almost certainly be seen as highly provocative by China and destabilising to regional security. The respected Indian maritime strategist, K.M. Panikkar, long ago recognised the adverse impact on regional security of China's strategic dilemma in the Indian Ocean, going so far as to suggest that Rangoon should be turned into a 'free port' for trading by China on the Indian Ocean (Panikkar 1943: 105) . Certainly there seems to be room for some new thinking in this area.
It is not entirely clear what role Australia could play in addressing this problem. Bonnor (2008: 168) suggests that rather than tilting toward one side or another, Australia's interests are in working with both India and China in shaping Asia's future security order to accommodate the demands of both and the legitimate interests of other regional powers. Australia might conclude, for example, that it is in its interests to facilitate China's role as a responsible stakeholder in the Indian Ocean (for example, through allowing China a voice in issues relating to the Indian Ocean in forums). As the Australian Defence White Paper notes, Australia needs to engage China as a responsible stakeholder in areas 'close to home ' (Australian Government 2009: 95) . This should include in the Indian Ocean region.
Some considerations in Australia's security engagement with India
There are many obvious areas of common interest between Australia and India, including terrorism, maritime policing and disaster management. Both share a strong interest in seeing the development of 'balanced' multilateral economic, political and security institutions in Asia. Both also have strong interests in the political stability of South Asia and South-East Asia. It is for this reason that Australia has been making significant efforts to gain New Delhi's attention. The security declaration was a notable step in creating a framework for further interaction, particularly in relation to the small 's' security issues. However, there are several potential sources of difficulty in the relationship.
First, we should expect continuing irritations in the relationship*/ for several reasons. Arguably, there are inherent difficulties in building a productive relationship between Australia and an emerging power with great-power aspirations such as India. An active middle power such as Australia is neither a major regional power (such as Japan) that is inherently important to India nor a small and useful 'gateway' state (such as Singapore). As an emerging power, India is also particularly demanding of recognition of its major-power status, an issue which arguably underlies India's strong reactions on the issues of uranium sales, Indian students and likely future instances where Australia may be perceived as not showing proper respect. Further, while there has been recognition of the potential for security cooperation, arguably, there is no mutual understanding that each is a crucial element in the other's security. This is compounded by a view in New Delhi that Australia is not an 'independent' strategic actor due to its relationship with the United States. Why deal with Canberra when one can deal with Washington? In short, other than as a potential energy supplier, Australia will find it difficult to make itself an 'indispensible partner' to India.
Second, Australia will need to navigate carefully in its relationships with India and China. Australia cannot place itself in a position where it must choose 'between' China and India, whether in South-East Asia or the Indian Ocean. As the short-lived quadrilateral initiative demonstrated, it would be a mistake to frame Australia's relationship with India within any 'China threat' theory. While perspectives on China in New Delhi are much more varied and nuanced than the Indian security commentariat would have us believe, they are still quite a distance from Canberra's. China is, after all, continuing to press territorial claims over India's Arunachal Pradesh state. Arguably, making China a central factor in the IndiaÁAustralia relationship (a position which it seems to occupy in the IndiaÁJapan relationship) is likely to be more counterproductive than productive.
Third, unlike some smaller states in the Indian Ocean region, Australia will not easily accede to India's desire to be recognised as the predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean (whether or not India is capable of realising those ambitions). Australia will seek to extend the predominance of US naval power throughout the Indian Ocean region for as long as possible, while maintaining its position as one of the major naval powers on the Indian Ocean littoral. Australia's likely objective will be to mould India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean, so that India does not disregard the legitimate security concerns of littoral states and extra-regional powers. Whereas India and the United States may see benefit in controlling China's sea lanes of communication, Australia arguably has a greater interest in ensuring that China's security dilemma in the Indian Ocean is not worsened. This article argues that addressing China's security dilemma in the Indian Ocean will be crucial in avoiding heightened strategic competition on Australia's doorstep.
Fourth, the lack of an effective Indian Ocean multilateral framework probably makes Australia's job of engaging India in the Indian Ocean more difficult. Previous attempts to create regional forums spanning the Indian Ocean have not been successful. Australia might take a more active role in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, where India's exclusion of key extra-regional stakeholders led it to be treated in Australia with a mild degree of scepticism or suspicion (Medcalf 2008a) . One might also consider widening the terms of reference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum to include the Indian Ocean (Buszynski 2009: 93) . In any event, Australia's enthusiasm for building multilateral institutions in East Asia contrasts sharply with its neglect of the Indian Ocean.
In the coming years, Australia will need to play a careful three-way juggling act between the United States, China and India. Australia's relationships with each of them are very different. Although Australia's relationship with the United States reflects its crucial role in Australia's security, the relationship with China is now arguably crucial to Australia in economic terms, and the significance of India may well grow to rival it. This means that Australia will need to carefully manage conflicts across its key economic, security and political relationships. In particular, it will be an important challenge for Australia to develop a security relationship with India that not only addresses areas of common interest but also allows Australia to help shape a potentially unstable security environment in the Indian Ocean. Notes 1. For a discussion of IndiaÁUS security relations over the last decade, see Schaffer (2009). 562 David Brewster
